

**FINAL REPORT //**

**Scenarios: “Aggression in  
Ukraine”, an analysis of refugee  
flows**

IRiE – Interregional Relations in Europe

Annex 24D // May 2022

This FINAL REPORT has been drawn up within the framework of the ESPON 2020 Cooperation Programme, as partly financed by the European Regional Development Fund.

ESPON EGTC is the Single Beneficiary of the Cooperation Programme, whose single Operation is implemented by ESPON EGTC, and co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the EU Member States and the Partner States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

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Printed on paper produced in an environmentally friendly manner

Layout and graphic design by BGRAPHIC, Denmark

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This document is an interim report.

The information contained herein is subject to change and does not commit the ESPON EGTC and the countries participating in the ESPON 2020 Cooperation Programme.

The final version of the report will be published as soon as approved.



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# 1 Background

In 1991, Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union, in an event preceded by the 1990 adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine, as well as the August 1991 attempted coup in the USSR. It may be further noted that a previous (early 20<sup>th</sup>-century) attempt to create a Ukrainian state called the Ukrainian People's Republic was confounded by the aggression of Bolshevik Russia.

However, long after gaining official independence, Ukraine remained under the political and economic influence of Russia, which saw Ukraine as a strategic partner and key country for established protectorate status. The core document regulating bilateral relations was the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership signed in 1997.

Notwithstanding its relative geopolitical weakness in the 1990s, Russia went on with a policy of keeping Ukraine within the post-Soviet space. Issues of relevance in that period related to the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet (by virtue of an agreement only ratified in 1999), support for separatist movements in Crimea, and of course the delimitation of the Ukrainian-Russian state border. In the latter case, the process reconciling where exactly borders would run lasted for more than 10 years, and was unfortunately accompanied by a series of contradictory statements regarding Ukraine's territorial integrity made by Russian officials. Thus the Agreement on the state border was only forthcoming in 2003, with signing in that year followed by ratification in 2004. The very year of signature in fact brought a first significant territorial conflict, in regard to control over the Kerch Strait (Tuzla Spit). It proved possible to arrive at a political settlement in that matter.

The signing of the Agreement delimiting borders in fact meant Ukraine perforce having to sign an agreement with Russia establishing a "Common Economic Space". However, possibilities for real-life implementation found themselves blocked at legislative level, by virtue of the Constitution being invoked.

More broadly, the 1990s witnessed a trend by which non-transparent political and economic agreements between Ukraine and Russia came to be signed, and ultimately offered indirect pre-conditioning of both the Orange and Dignity Revolutions. It was in the same period (in 1994) that the Budapest Memorandum also gained its signature, ensuring Ukraine's loss of its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees now seen as ineffective in practice.

At the same time, the period from the late 1990s through to the early 2000s brought qualitative change as Russia secured steady economic growth and began to voice ever-stronger claims to global dominance, with a "Eurasian" geopolitical doctrine emerging. Author O. Dugin notes: "The fact of the existence of a sovereign Ukraine is at the geopolitical level a declaration of Russia's geopolitical war... The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow". Ukrainian experts further note how, just a little later, it was no longer an intention to establish a protectorate that was being referred to, but also about Ukraine's territorial division, with southern and eastern regions slated for inclusion within the Russian Federation.

In an April 25<sup>th</sup> 2005 speech to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin voiced what is now the familiar thesis that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century", while also declaring that a Eurasian Union would be created. Then, speaking at the 2007 Munich Conference, the leader emphasised "Russia's re-entry into the world arena" ... and imperial-sounding ambitions. Mention started to be made of a *Novorossia* whose historical extent took in the Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odessa regions of Ukraine.

Thus begins a period of strong impact on Ukraine in the political, economic, energy and information sectors, with an intensification of activity in Ukraine on the part of both Russian business and pro-Russian political parties. Meanwhile, Ukraine continued to balance European and Russian vectors. Certain political forces made further efforts in that regard, ensuring emergence of an inter-regional polarisation, somewhat resembling the so-called inter-civilisational "fault line" after Huntington. At that point a population in Ukraine's industrial eastern and (to some extent also) southern regions, regarded as mostly pro-Russian but in fact much influenced by Soviet narratives and Russian propaganda, chose to extend its electoral support to the Party of Regions and Viktor Yanukovich, who ran for President. In contrast, central and (in particular) western regions of Ukraine tended to offer their support to pro-European leader Viktor Yushchenko.

That election campaign, and numerous violations perpetrated by pro-Russian forces, combined with Russia's explicit+illicit support for its own candidate to foster the Orange Revolution bringing election victory for Yushchenko. 2004-5 thus offered Russia its first clear and unpleasant signal regarding the uncontrollable nature of Kyiv, as well as a strengthening of Ukraine's European vector.

A second step, also viewable by Moscow as unfriendly, entailed Kyiv's undisguised support for Georgia during the 2008 war. No other CIS country provided support of that kind.

Responses came with the so-called "Gas Wars" of 2005-6 and 2008-9, as well as "Food Wars" – meaning restrictions on the export of certain groups of commodity, attempts to discredit Ukraine's foreign policy, and an intensification of the informational pressure controlled media were in a position to exert. Until recently, it was the energy dependence of Ukraine (and the EU) that allowed the political influence of The Kremlin to be leveraged. This came on the back of tremendous growth in Russian business's share of markets in communications and telecommunications, the fuel and energy sector, and banking.

In any case, the Ukrainian population's support for the Russian vector continued at a relatively high level, with 2002 polls finding 56% and 54.8% of the population in favour of this path of development as of 2002 and 2010 respectively.

It was in the latter year that Russia's "Fifth Column" ensured Viktor Yanukovych's coming to power. By concluding the Kharkiv Agreements prolonging the existence of the Navy Base in Crimea through to 2042, Yanukovych effectively betrayed Ukraine's national-security interests, in exchange for available gas. He also did much to undermine Ukraine's defensive capacities (through both low funding and sale of assets). Paradoxically, then, it was under that Presidency (as of 2013) that preparations to sign an Association Agreement with the EU were commenced with. The objective that was Ukrainian membership of the European Union also found its reflection in Ukraine's Law "on Principles of Internal and Foreign Policy", dated July 1st 2010 – even as that law also provided for a non-aligned status of the country.

Pressure on the Ukrainian government combined with Yanukovych's refusal to sign the Association Agreement to encourage the mass protests known as the "Revolution of Dignity". The consequence of that was a radical change in political elites, as well as the 2014 signature of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, and a beneficial process of visa liberalisation for Ukrainians from 2017 onwards.

2014 responses from Russia came with its infamous annexing of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. That led to Ukrainian recognition of Russia as an aggressor, as well as to the subsequent denunciation of various trade and political agreements.

So it is that Ukraine has been in a state of military conflict with Russia for more than 7 years now, even if the intensity decreased somewhat following the 2019 Presidential Elections pending a change of political course for Kyiv. Otherwise, efforts to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity on the basis of the Minsk Agreements remained ineffective, as did negotiations in the Normandy format.

However, the time from the beginning of Russia's occupation has brought significant change in public attitudes towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. As of 2021, the latter gained the respective support of 62 and 54% of respondents, with even eastern and southern Ukraine now characterised by levels of support for the EU at 43.6 and 48.8% respectively. Significant progress has also been made on the Ukrainian language and church autocephaly, even as attitudes towards Russia have deteriorated markedly.

Apparently aware of such trends, Moscow spent 2021 concentrating military equipment, weapons and troops near its borders with Ukraine, but also on the territory of Belarus. There was meanwhile a growing political pressure exerted on Ukraine, the EU and the United States, to accept a status for Ukraine as non-aligned, and to ensure that Russian influence in Eastern Europe might be restored.

On February 24, 2022, Russia declared that it was launching its infamous "Special Military Operation", in fact a war waged around the whole perimeter of the shared border. As of May 2022, the Oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv have suffered most from bombing and shelling, while those of Kherson and Zaporizhia remain almost completely occupied, while the Oblasts of Kyiv, Sumy and Chernihiv have been liberated from occupation.

Against that background, it is currently impossible to say clearly how things will develop, or how long the conflict may last. Many experts are now inclined to envisage a more or less long-term scenario, with con-



sequences on differing scales. They do not rule out a transition to a frozen conflict, which will have corresponding socio-economic consequences. There can also be no precluding of the use of either nuclear or chemical weapons.

Relevant forecasts are usually based on an assessment of Russia's prospects for military, technological and economic depletion, Ukraine's military performance, likely political and geopolitical changes (e.g. as regards China, elections in countries that are key global players, the sentiments of Russia's elites, and so on).

In its global and European dimensions, the war in Ukraine has already proved highly significant in restructuring trade ties and energy strategies, including through extensive imposition of sanctions on Russia, programmes to support a growing number of refugees, and promised support for Ukraine's economic and infrastructural recovery.

## 2 Data and methodology. Description of the scenario

As the onset of war in 2022 has not changed traditional migration routes, analysis from the point of view of the EU and ESPON Space will tie the impact of the scenario with significant regional differences, and will focus on first-contact countries, above all Poland.

The main features of refugee behaviour will be determined by the duration of the war, the scale of the destruction, the capacity for adaptation displayed by the host country, the economic policy pursued by the Ukrainian government, and the availability of international assistance through which that policy might actually be implemented.

Pre-war assessments were already showing that, after a few years spent in host countries, between a quarter and half of all migrants felt as comfortable there as they had done in Ukraine, and were thus moving gradually in the direction of a permanent immigration status. Now, given the destructive impact that has been seen, and the level of risk, it seems reasonable to foresee an increase in the share of migrants in the latter category. EU Member States will thus see opportunities for demographic pressure to be reduced as certain segments of labour markets become better filled.

Equally, circumstances disadvantageous for EU labour markets may reflect certain gender imbalances characteristic for the refugees in question, above all the predominance of women with children. This is happening in the face of a situation in which such sectors as construction are in need of male employment. Furthermore, some of today's newcomers (as women with small children, elderly or disabled people) will be needing significant social support. In addition, account needs to be taken of the fact that a significant percentage of those arriving recently are people who have never been abroad before (or else have been to Russia or Belarus only). Such people may find integration into new social structures entirely impossible, or else will only be capable of integration via a slow process.

There is a considerable measure of uncertainty relating to split families, in which the husbands and fathers remain in Ukraine. Where the women and children involved in this category integrate successfully abroad, it has to be seen as more likely that males will also transfer abroad after the war ends or in certain other circumstances. Further uncertainty of course relates to the degree of destruction ultimately wrought in Ukraine's cities.

According to experts, there is a high probability of integration among young, ambitious people who will either study in the EU and abroad, or can gain employment as a local population, given their high-level qualifications, language skills and other aspects.

Numbers of refugees, both new and in host countries since the start of the war, may later prove adjustable in the light of policy pursued by the Ukrainian government. Of particular importance will be the existence and accessibility of programmes of social support, the rapid construction and provisioning of temporary and permanent housing, business support in safer and less-affected regions, labour-market regulation, access to quality education, and so on. Draft versions of such programmes are already in preparation, even as results as regards successful implementation will only become clear through testing over time.

The results of surveys conducted in March-April 2022 make clear the presence of a large share of migrants motivated to return home from abroad, a low share of people who remain in Ukraine motivated to leave, as well as a considerable share of people willing to play their part in rebuilding their country. Equally, surveys reveal problems arising out of insufficient savings and unemployment. Against such a background, there are patterns of indeterminate behavior and situational decision-making in relation to both migration and host countries. But where the scenario becomes either more severe or more prolonged, an increase in the magnitude of the wave of migration is only to be expected, even as expectations are lower at the particular time of writing.

Thus far, only a few studies have sought to foresee the scale of migration from Ukraine induced by military action. And where these have appeared, they are inevitably founded upon a situation regarded as capable of rapid change. But the UNHCR forecast for December 2022 envisages 3.4 million Ukrainians in first-contact countries (Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary), as well as 8.35 million migrants in total.

### **From visions of the war to a scenario**

Refugee volumes and distribution will depend on developments in the war situation. To better address this complicated and largely unpredictable mix of factors and events of a military, political and economic nature, we proceed by way of collapse into the two orthogonal dimensions of:

- **war severity,**
- **war duration.**

**War severity** can be deemed to comprise four factors, all of which are of immense bearing for the Ukrainian population, even as their impacts on refugee behavior can be regarded as variable. Thus:

- **territorial extent** is the most important driver of new refugees, as mediated most by Russian attempts to capture certain cities or regions permanently, as opposed to engaging in occasional shelling or else achieving nothing more than short-lived advances of troops;
- **severity of material destruction** can be viewed as having more an impact on post-war decisions than current ones, and as depending (in a highly unpredictable manner) on both the post-war economic situation and political decisions;
- **civilian casualties** generate new refugees, but only among the insensitive population (see below), to the extent that the volume remains low;
- **armed-forces casualties** are not regarded as generating new refugees in and of themselves, but rather influence decision-making among refugees already in First-Line Countries (for example by lowering numbers of returnees).

In our estimations of total refugee volumes, we focus on the so-called sensitive part of the population, by which we mean those who are younger, better-educated, higher-earning, and having children or elderly people in their care. It is clear that these features are not mutually exclusive. While this group of people proves most mobile, and is most motivated to avoid war zones, it most probably encompasses a part of the population anyway reflecting on migration even before the war broke out. The sensitive population as so categorised is capable of rapid reaction, on the basis, not only of actual developments with the war, but also available information and rumours (to the extent that their actions may predate actual operations). In contrast, what we may term the insensitive population has less to lose by staying, even as it anyway has more-limited capacities to engage in resettlement (given the inclusion of older people without families, for example. Mainly it will be extreme circumstances that enforces movement among these people, who are most likely to make internal movements only.

The **war duration** dimension extends to several phenomena, i.e. destructive effects (seen as occurring at a constant pace per unit of time, and so adding up in a simple but inevitable way that amounts to *cumulation*; effects reflecting the passage of time that are manifested in changed living conditions in FLCs (as refugee pockets deplete, attachments to new residences grow, and new jobs are found or lost); and effects reflecting the passage of time as this operates in regard to individual perceptions and decisions among prospective or actual refugees. In the case of the third factor, it is further possible to anticipate:

- the pushing of some of the less-sensitive population out of Ukraine (even if no war-induced territorial changes ensue) – simply because life conditions continue to degrade,
- encouragement of those temporarily present in First-Line Countries to take more-radical decisions as regards their future lives (remaining in FLCs on a more-permanent basis, or moving further west, or actually returning to Ukraine),
- stimulation of moves to particular countries that have re-settlement programmes on offer,
- a reduction in the capacity of First-Line Countries to accommodate more refugees, with the finding of accommodation, jobs and financial support becoming progressively more difficult.

## 2.1 Cases

Final cases result from the sub-division of the aforementioned severity and duration dimensions into two broad categories as low or high. The result is for the following 4 cases to be generated.

### Case A (limited damage in the context of a short war)

The conflict ends soon. Destruction proceeds at an intensity similar to that recorded so far (up to 15<sup>th</sup> May 2022). Only 8 regions of the country are affected. A reconstruction process supported by Western countries commences. As a result, only a small percentage of all Ukrainians decide to go further than their selected country of first contact. A large proportion go on to return to Ukraine, while most of the remainder remain in the neighbour EU Member States of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). The percentage of those proceeding beyond Europe also remains small (ESPON Space).

Migration from Russia and Belarus stops. New sanctions are not imposed on these countries. Nevertheless, the scale of returns remains small. There is no mobilisation for military service in these countries. First-contact countries do not concentrate migrants from Russia and Belarus, with the percentage of Russians moving beyond ESPON space thus being much higher than that characterising Ukrainians.

**Case B** (limited damage in the context of a long war)

The conflict drags on, but is frozen. Destruction follows on at an intensity similar to that recorded so far, and affects only part of the country. No large-scale reconstruction process can begin as foreign funds may not truly be engaged until war is completely extinguished. Nevertheless, non-impacted regions regain some economic activity. Even so, more Ukrainians elect to move beyond their countries of first contact. While only some go back to Ukraine. Many others remain in neighbouring EU countries (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). Still, the percentage who now go beyond Europe increases (ESPON Space). Meanwhile, some will come to the EU for purely economic reasons, perhaps in line with the availability of seasonal work. Those failing to find a job will either return or head off in search of work beyond ESPON Space.

Migrations from Russia and Belarus continue, even as new sanctions are imposed on those countries. The scale of returns is small, and that may be all the more so as mobilisation for the armed forces in those countries begins. First-contact countries are not places of concentration of migrants from Russia and Belarus. The percentage of Russians heading beyond ESPON space is much higher than that characterising Ukrainians.

**Case C** (major destruction in the context of a short war)

The conflict ends soon, with a high-intensity impact of the war, but no cumulation over time. While the territorial extent may be wide, only some regions suffer total economic failure. A process of reconstruction with the support of Western countries can begin, even as the cost is enormous. As a result, some Ukrainians return to their own country, while some stay in neighbouring EU states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania). A small percentage also go beyond Europe (ESPON Space). The rapid nature of this scenario needs to be borne in mind, and in particular the way in which people from border and neighbouring regions will actually benefit. Currently, there are also internally displaced people, the number of which cannot be estimated accurately (7.7 million people in Ukraine as a whole, according to the IOM, with about 3 million in western regions). Proceeding then on a generalised assumption that refugees make up about 30% of the populations in affected regions, such percentages for Vinnytsia, Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Khmelnytsky and Chernivtsi regions, and the number of internally-displaced people in Western Ukraine, it is possible to arrive at a figure of some 4.5 million refugees in a position to cross the border in a month or more.

Meanwhile, migrations from Russia and Belarus continue. While new sanctions are not imposed, the internal situation remains tense. However, there is no mobilisation for the military in these countries. The scale of returns is small. First Nations do not prove to be places of concentration of migrants from Russia and Belarus, and the percentage of all Russians heading outside ESPON space is far higher than that characterising Ukrainians.

**Case D** (major destruction in the context of a long war)

The conflict lasts a long time. A combination of war of high intensity and a high level of cumulative damage ensures that certain towns and regions simply collapse, even as the rest of the country heads for economic failure. Furthermore, the reconstruction process is unable to begin. Numbers of refugees increase, and first-line countries will no longer be able to accommodate further waves of migrants. As a result, more Ukrainians start to reach areas beyond the country of first contact. Almost no one returns to Ukraine. In this scenario, the assumption is that approximately 30% of the population of regions not affected to a significant extent before now become refugees, as do about 50% of people thus far displaced internally. Additional migration from previously-affected regions will also account for a certain share. In this case, there are new refugees who will remain in ESPON Space and beyond (as a diaspora) for a long time to come. The total number of refugees then exceeds 10 million, even as the percentage of all of these heading beyond Europe (ESPON Space) is on the increase.

Migrations from Russia and Belarus continue. New sanctions are imposed on these countries. The scale of returns is small. Mobilisation for the army in these countries begins. First-contact countries are not places

of concentration for migrants from Russia and Belarus. The percentage of Russians heading beyond ESPON space is much higher than the corresponding figure for Ukrainians.

### **From cases to a model**

All the factors underpinning the aforementioned severity and duration dimensions are cast into the several parameters representing input to our model, i.e.:

1. the total volume of refugees, in line with a BY, RU and UA breakdown,
2. the share of (UA-only) refugees staying in the First-Line Country, as set against those moving beyond,
3. the share of refugees heading for ESPON-Space countries as opposed to the rest of the world (again with a BY, RU and UA breakdown).

In the cases of citizens of Belarus and Russia, directions of travel were not considered, even as no concentration of migrants in first-line countries was assumed. Assumptions thus relate solely to total numbers of people leaving and to percentages moving beyond ESPON space.

As the assumptions described above were subject to determinations, the elements taken account of were:

- a) The (region-by-region) extents of armed operations in Ukraine, as a factor forcing people to leave [currently, regions most affected are Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kyivskyi, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions, as well as Kyiv city (as occupied now or previously, experiencing significant destruction now or previously, and constituting areas of significant risk) – together these areas have a population of 21,691,088, even as the total number of refugees is at a level around 20% of the population of these regions. Equally, a Razumkov Center<sup>1</sup> survey conducted from March 15 through to April 1, 2022 found that greatest proportions of people then crossing the border were from Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kyivskyi and Kharkiv regions, as well as Kyiv city – i.e. regions with a total population of 13,074,943, among which an estimated 30% constitute refugees].
- b) The demographic structure characterising migrants [Ukrainian statistics hold that the total number of women aged 15-64 in the population, as combined with numbers of children (0-15-year-olds) of both sexes amount to some 18.6 million people. As UNHCR data in turn reveal that 90% of refugees are women and children, a certain correlation is noted. Were destruction to be full, most of these people could be expected to flee].
- c) Experience with other migration crises, notably the recent one involving Syria.

Table 2.1. presents the assumptions described above, in line with each of the different cases outlined above becoming the reality.

<sup>1</sup><https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/ukrainski-bizhentsi-nastroi-ta-otsinky?fbclid=IwAR2LVmqxP2k2S6gQ-d2MAeEGBtHuF0EFWn96jUL-6hSGzREtDpzYGd4dL4>

**Table 2.1. Scenario assumptions.**

Ukrainians	War damage	Length of war	Number of refugees	% in First-Contact country	% migrating outside ESPON Space	Number for regional estimations in ESPON Space minus PL, HU, SK, RO	Comments
Case A	limited	short	3 500 000	88	10	378 000	Total number similar to present outmigration, taking into account returns to Ukraine (27%-30%)
Case B	limited	long	4 500 000	70	20	900 000	Case A + 1000000 newcomers (internally displaced who now decide to move abroad or escape from occupied territories)
Case C	severe	short	7 000 000	75	10	1 260 000	A second wave, first of all from new source regions
Case D	severe	long	10 500 000	55	20	3 360 000	Two assumptions. Syrian scenario (30% of population became refugees) and extrapolation from the highly affected Ukrainian regions (now the number of refugees is about 20-30% of the population in those regions).

Belarusians	War damage	Length of the war	Number of refugees	% in the first contact country	% migrating outside ESPON Space	Number for regional estimations in ESPON Space minus PL, HU, SK, RO	Comments
Case A	limited	short	50 000		10	45 000	Status quo
Case B	limited	long	150 000		20	120 000	Consequences of sanctions become more visible
Case C	severe	short	50 000		10	45 000	Even in the case of harsher sanctions there are no short-term consequences
Case D	severe	long	200 000		20	160 000	Harsher sanctions, more-visible consequences, new protests even probable

Russians	War damage	Length of the war	Number of refugees	% in the first contact country	% migrating outside ESPON Space	Number for regional estimations in ESPON Space minus PL, HU, SK, RO	Comments
Case A	limited	short	200 000		20	160 000	Status quo, but EU not main destination
Case B	limited	long	500 000		30	350 000	Consequences of sanctions become more visible, pushing people to move abroad
Case C	severe	short	300 000		20	240 000	Even in the case of harsher sanctions there are no short-term consequences. However, a more-active mobilisation will matter
Case D	severe	long	1 000 000		30	700 000	The harsher the sanctions the more visible the consequences, also as total mobilisation occurs


### The model

As has been noted, the cases supply 3 basic parameters to the model, of which the most important is the total volume of refugees, established for all countries of interest (BY, RU and UA). Of the three states concerned, the one experiencing a distinctly greater impact of the war is Ukraine, with the subsequent process of migration also differing significantly. We therefore apply a different approach to Ukraine, with this characterised by the two key factors of:

- the refugee status of Ukrainians departing from their country (we broadly use the term refugee in respect of all the countries, even as the citizens of BY and RU who are involved would be better qualified as migrants)
- the recognition of 4 **First-Line Countries** (FLC). i.e. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania+Moldova combined, as important intermediate stages in the migration process.

Provided below is a data-flow description involving Ukrainians, given that this model is the most refined of the three. In the case of the Belarussians and Russians, the intermediate step involving the First-Line Countries is omitted.

**Figure 2.1: Model scheme**



The data flow starts with a breakdown of all refugees by reference to First-Line Countries, this being based on the most-recent UNHCR data (from 11.05.2022). We assume that the flow proportions into the four countries remain constant over the time horizon designated for the scenario and these are:

country	refugees reception
<b>PL</b>	<b>50.9%</b>
<b>RO</b>	<b>13.9%</b>
RU	12.2%
<b>HU</b>	<b>9.1%</b>
MV	7.1%
<b>SK</b>	<b>6.4%</b>
BY	0.4%

This also means that we keep the share of Ukrainian outflow to other neighbouring countries (Russia, Belarus and Moldova) in line with current UNHCR data, which draws up a substantial part of the outflow - altogether 19.7%.

Next, for each of the four countries, the share of refugees willing to stay in the new country of residence is determined, with initial contributions of the 4 cells to the EU32 inflow table made in this way.

Refugees not willing to stay make an outflow from FLCs to 28 EU countries. In the next step, this outflow is stripped off the refugees heading outside of ESPON space, driven by case parameter "share of refugees heading for ESPON space countries". The remaining flow is then distributed over 28 EU countries.

At this step, we assume new refugees/migrants follow the pre-war (and pre-Covid) pattern of immigration, distinct for BY, RU and UA. Other than in our principal work on EU flows, we do not use proper immigration (EUROSTAT MIGR\_IMM3CTB variable). This is because:

- immigration data for BY, RU and UA is not available for 10 out of 32 countries, including important recipients like FR, DE, UK and PL;
- much more reliant data is available for non-EU32 citizens, which presence is documented by permits to stay in target country.

Our immigration estimate is composed of permits to stay granted to BE, RU and UA citizens (MIGR\_RESFIRST) plus citizenship acquisitions (MIGR\_ACQ). To be compliant with migration definition, we use only permits granted for 12 months or longer<sup>2</sup>. The validity of data is 2019, except for UK – 2018. It must be noted that while this immigration pattern provides only *proportion* for inflow to each of EU 28 countries, some countries may be more receptive to refugees (UA) then previously – to migrants. This may be the case in Germany, which increased openness to refugees after the Syrian war.

A last step sees a distribution across country regions of the inflows into each EU32 country. Use was made here of the same method as previously, taking the current diaspora of BY, RU and UA migrants as an indicator of the force of regional attraction within a country.

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<sup>2</sup> The issue of discrepancies between permits data and immigration data has been often raised. Our combined permits over 12 months + citizenship acquisitions showed less deviation from reported immigration than raw permits investigated by Giampaolo Lanzieri, "Comparability of migration and residence permits data in the EU statistics" ([https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/migr\\_imm\\_i\\_esms\\_an3.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/Annexes/migr_imm_i_esms_an3.pdf))




### 3 Territorial distribution of populations from UA, RU, BY across ESPON regions (baseline)

This chapter presents the spatial distribution of migrants from Ukraine in 2019. The number of migrants was estimated by reference to *Eurostat* regarding numbers of permanent-residence permits (for more than 12 months) as well as instances of citizenship granted per country (see Chapter 2 for details).

As of 2019, a concentration of migrants from Ukraine can be seen mainly in CEECs, above all Poland (69,400), the Czech Republic (46,000), Hungary (23,300), Slovakia (12,500) and Lithuania (10,100). Among Western European countries, it is in Germany that the largest numbers of Ukrainian nationals were resident (9900), as followed by Italy (6500), Spain (6200) and Portugal (3400).

In Poland, there is a clear concentration of migrants in the Warsaw region (15,500), followed by the Wielkopolska region (7600) and Lower Silesia (7100) (Fig. 3.1). This can be taken as reflecting the influence of the attractive labour markets of the Warsaw, Cracow and Wrocław agglomerations. A relatively large number of migrants (6300) is recorded in the Lublin region, and this can obviously be thought to result from the immediate proximity of Ukraine where this region is concerned. The situation is similar in Slovakia, where more than 70% of migrants arriving in 2019 concentrate in the region actually bordering on to Ukraine (Východné Slovensko). In contrast, in the case of the Czech Republic, the regional distribution is characterised by a clear dominance of Prague (16,500). Together with the Střední Čechy region surrounding Prague, this concentrates 24,600 (or 53.5% of all migration into the Czech Republic in 2019). At the other extreme there are two regions in the east of the country with only a small number of migrants from Ukraine (Moravskoslezsko – 800 and Střední Morava – 1500). Hungary also shows, on the one hand, a dominance of the largest metropolis (8200 migrants from Ukraine) and, on the other, a concentration of migration inflow in the region bordering Ukraine (Észak-Alföld, 6100). In the case of Lithuania, a similar number of migrants from Ukraine stayed on in both *NUTS* 2 regions.

**Fig. 3.1: 2019 inflows of migrants from Ukraine, by region**



Author's own elaboration based on *EUROSTAT* data.


The highest concentrations of migrants from Ukraine in the regions of Western Europe relate mainly to Italy's Lombardy (1500) and Campania (1200), to Catalonia (1300) and to the Comunidad de Madrid and Valenciana (1300 and 1200 respectively), and to Área Metropolitana de Lisboa in Portugal (1200).

Nothing but marginal roles are assignable to other European countries, where 2019 migration inflows from Ukraine are concerned. This also applies to Romania, which borders on to Ukraine, with this most likely indicating and unattractive labour market and a wage gap too limited to motivate a decision regarding migration.


In the case of migration from Belarus as of 2019, one basic migration factor definitely becoming apparent relates to distance. The largest inflows are those into CEECs (Poland - 8700, Lithuania - 7000, and the Czech Republic - 3100). Where the regional (*NUTS 2*) breakdown is concerned, the highest concentrations are those characterising the two Lithuanian regions of Sostines regionas - 3000 and Vidurio ir vakaru Lietuvos regionas - 4000 (Fig. 3.3). In the case of Poland, the largest number of migrants (2400) concentrate into the region of Warsaw as capital city, as well as into Podlaskie region (1900), given the fact that that is directly adjacent across the border. In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, the inflow was mainly concentrated in Prague (accounting for 42.5% of the total inflow into the Czech Republic in 2019).

Other countries play a marginal role in the inflow of migrants from Belarus. In 2019, that inflow was mainly concentrated in Europe's largest metropolises (of Paris, London, Stockholm and Berlin), as well as in Catalonia and Lombardy. However, inflow values only slightly exceeded 100 people.


**Figure 3.2: 2019 inflows of migrants from Ukraine into different regions, as expressed per 1000 inhabitants**



In relation to numbers of inhabitants in regions, the immigration inflow from Ukraine was almost solely of significance in the CEECs. Despite its reporting the highest absolute values, Poland received immigration that was relatively less intensive than that observed in either the Czech Republic or Lithuania. The highest values for the indicator (reaching 0.5% of the entire population) characterised the three capital cities of Prague, Warsaw and Vilnius. A similarly high indicator value was characteristic of eastern Slovakia. Increased values were also noted throughout Lithuania, and in Hungarian regions like that of Budapest. In Poland, away from Warsaw it is possible to note a relatively more-marked concentration in the Lublin region.

**Figure 3.3: 2019 inflows of migrants from Belarus into different regions**

The spatial distribution of 2019 migrants from Russia proved to be quite different, as this is primarily seen to be directed at Western European countries, mainly Germany, with 13,300 in 2019). However, the Czech Republic also takes a high position (with 8500). Among remaining countries, mention can be made of France (7200), the UK (6800) and Spain (6200). Regionally, Russian migration is concentrated mainly in metropolitan areas (of Prague, London, Paris, Barcelona and Berlin), as well as regions attractive from a tourism point of view (like Andalucía, Cataluña and Comunidad Valenciana in Spain) (Fig. 3.4). Where countries directly adjacent to Russia are concerned, Finland has attracted the most major inflow of migration (involving 4300 people, and among them 1900 in the Helsinki-Uusimaa region), along with the Baltic countries (Estonia - 1500, Latvia - 1300 and Lithuania - 1200) – whose attractiveness can be thought to reside in former ties within the USSR.

**Figure 3.4: 2019 inflows of migrants from Russia, into different regions**

## 4 Border traffic with First-Contact countries

### 4.1 The Polish-Ukrainian border


Migration has been a phenomenon typical for Ukraine since almost the time of its independence in 1991 (as well as historically during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries). Until 2014, the migration in question was mainly labour-related, with the 1990s seeing demand confined largely to low-skilled labour. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century it is educational migration that has gradually been gaining in popularity, as well as migration among workers with higher education attainment in fields like ICT. The reasons for such migration are both economic, as well as related to the possibility of a higher quality of life being accessed. About half of the visits this migration entailed were short-term in nature, with the most attractive destinations in the EU remaining Poland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Hungary and Portugal. Post-2014, visa liberalisation and Russian aggression (in the form of the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk) were among the factors intensifying migration. Pendular migrations to Poland remained particularly common.

The closing of the Polish-Ukrainian border in the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic brought a more drastic decline in cross-border traffic than was characteristic for the Polish-Belarusian border (given the transit-related character of that stretch). In 2019, the weekly average figures for border traffic was of 418,000 crossings (in both directions), with this comparing to a 2020 figure as low as 150,400. However, 2021 brought a steady re-increase in cross-border traffic – up to 167,900 crossings a week. This traffic was generated primarily by citizens of Ukraine. In the intensity of the traffic it is possible to observe two Christmas-New Year peaks (in 2020 and 2022, with the second decidedly more marked than the first), an Easter peak, and fluctuations reflecting demand on the labour market relating to seasonal jobs. The traffic of persons of other nationalities is seen to be marginal when compared with that involving Ukrainians.

The upward trend was also visible in the monthly setting, in association with the post-pandemic renewal of cross-border traffic (to the extent that January 2022 witnessed 433,600 inward crossings by citizens of Ukraine, as compared with under 267,000 in the analogous period of the preceding year). The increase noted for February 2022 (up to 669,000) was already occurring in the context of war being waged by Russia against Ukraine.

Following that Russian aggression, a jump-like increase of inflows of Ukrainian citizens was observed. At the peak moment (in the 10<sup>th</sup> week of the year), more than 720,000 Ukrainian citizens crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border (Fig. 4.1). In parallel with the peak of border crossings by citizens of Ukraine, a smaller peak involving crossings by citizens of other countries was also to be observed, given that these had also been staying in Ukraine previously. From the beginning of January through to February 23<sup>rd</sup> 2022, the daily average inflow of Ukrainians stood at 14,500, even as 577 people per day of other nationalities (Poles excluded) were also crossing. Then, in the period from February 24<sup>th</sup> to March 31<sup>st</sup>, the daily average inflow of Ukrainians reached 62,900, with that of citizens of other countries reaching 3006. The largest shares among the latter were accounted for by citizens of Germany, Russia and Uzbekistan (see Table 4.1).

**Figure 4.1: Traffic on the Ukrainian section of the border in the years 2019-2022 (on a weekly basis for the entire years 2019, 2020 and 2021, as well as the first three months of 2022)**



The inflow of refugees from Ukraine was also visible at airports, also on the monthly scale, with January and February 2022 seeing lower numbers than in the analogous period of 2021. This was associated with the limited possibilities for evacuation from Ukraine to be achieved via air transport, as well as with organisational issues associated with preparations to depart from Ukraine.

**Table 4.1: Top 10 nationalities crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border (arrivals)**

Citizenship	January 2019	February 2019	March 2019	January 2022	February 2022	March 2022
Ukraine	774 968	704 701	795 109	433 609	669 042	1 944 111
Germany	3 882	1 503	1 985	3 483	2 218	6 172
Russia	687	445	570	465	999	5 483
Uzbekistan	19	19	13	31	2 100	5 299
USA	363	328	404	41	1 594	4 549
India	13	10	22	6	1 713	4 370
Georgia	249	224	264	275	815	3 568
Azerbaijan	72	59	77	33	322	3 467
UK	282	115	143	143	571	3 062
Vietnam	4	5	9	5	55	2 961


Source: author's own elaboration based on Border Guard data

The dynamic to refugee flows from Ukraine has been very great since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. From the first days onwards, numbers of people fleeing the war exceeded 100,000 daily, with the peak figure noted at the border with Ukraine involving more than 200,000 crossings per day. After 16th March, this movement stabilised at a level around 50,000 people per day (Fig. 4.2A). While the dynamics to the flows for different sections of border are similar, the absolute values do differ. Clearly the greatest numbers of people have been crossing the border with Poland (with almost 4 times as many there as in relation to the next-largest country, Romania). Equally, from mid-April onwards it was possible to note



a higher rate of increase in border traffic involving Ukrainians at their country's border with Russia itself (Fig. 4.2B).

**Figure 4.2: Traffic at the Ukrainian border, A) daily – for all sections of the border taken together, B) cumulatively for the different sections of border**



## 4.2 The Polish-Belarusian border

The moment of closure of the Polish-Belarusian border due to the COVID-19 pandemic marks a distinct breakdown point for cross-border traffic. And two years later that traffic remains at a level far below what was observed before. Thus, in 2021 the weekly average for two-way traffic stood at 41,900 crossings, as compared with 169,500 in 2019. Structuring by nationality confirms a clear prevalence of Belarusians. Yet, since the pandemic began it has been possible to observe a relatively slow increase in border crossings made by Belarusians as such. Two distinct peaks of cross-border traffic are to be discerned – during the Christmas-New Year periods of 2020/2021 and 2021/2022, along with smallish fluctuations in traffic intensity at Easter time and at the beginning of November (All Saints Day in Poland and the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution in Belarus and associated holidays). There is also a visible temporary increase in arrivals among Belarusians following Russia's aggression against Ukraine, with a simultaneous drop in outward movements. As regards remaining nationalities it is only cross-border traffic on a very limited scale that is to be noted. During the summer vacationing period of 2021 there was a small increase in the cross-border traffic involving Poles, along with minor fluctuations in traffic characterising remaining nationalities in the second half of 2021, this being linked with the migration-related crisis at the frontier between Belarus and the European Union (and most especially its Polish-Belarusian section).

Month-by-month analysis of cross-border traffic with a further breakdown by nationality reveals a small increase in arrivals by Belarusians during the first three months of 2022, in comparison with the analogous period of 2021. As regards structuring by nationality, there was a perceptible inflow of Ukrainians across the Polish-Belarusian border in March 2022 – following the Russian aggression. The marginal share accounted for by Russians in cross-border traffic is noticeable. In March 2022, numbers of Ukrainians arriving via the Polish-Belarusian border were 8 times higher than in January 2022. However, when an analogous comparison is made for citizens of the Russian Federation, it is a decline in numbers of crossings of almost 40% that is to be observed.

## 4.3 The Polish-Russian border

Traffic across the Polish-Russian border is decidedly the most limited of any of the border segments considered here. Fluctuations in the intensity of traffic there are first and foremost a reflection of economic conditions, differences in rates of exchange for currencies and differences in the prices of various goods and services. To an extent differences to be noted also reflect the quality of bilateral relations. Poles mainly take advantage of lower fuel prices on the Russian side, while Russians are attracted by a more diversified assortment of goods on the Polish side, be this in relation to foodstuffs or even construction materials. Beyond that, the location of the Kaliningrad District is such that Russians take frequent advantage of tourist facilities or entertainments on offer over on the Polish side.

In terms of temporal profile, there is a distinct concentration of traffic involving citizens of Russia that could be seen to connect with the Christmas-New Year season of both 2019 and 2020, and hence also with a

desire to do shopping. The same peaks also relate to people included in the category of "Other foreigners". On the other hand, where Poles are concerned, there is markedly reduced interest in travel to Kaliningrad district immediately before the Christmas and New Year season.


The scale of cross-border traffic dropped markedly following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is seen most clearly in the case of traffic involving Poles, who still (at the time of writing) may not enter the territory of Russia (which has still not restored cross-border traffic on general principles such as applied prior to the pandemic). Currently, only people in very few categories are able to enter the territory of Russia from the Polish side. Thus, while the weekly average figure for border traffic in 2019 was 66,700 crossings (in both directions), in 2021 that figure was as low as 4500. There was a slight increase in numbers of border crossings at the turn of the year 2022, but this was solely related to citizens of Russia and other foreigners, in a manner that can readily be attributed to Christmas-season holiday shopping.

In the wake of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, traffic changed significantly. A decidedly greater inflow of citizens of Ukraine than before the aggression is now to be noted: while in February 2022 just 193 such arrivals were registered, in March 2022 the figure was already as high as 2446. There is also a dramatic fall in arrivals of Russians into Poland. In the first quarter of 2019, i.e. before the pandemic, the average number of arrivals involving Russians was 75,200 per month. In the analogous period of 2022 the figure was a mere 6100.

## 5 The territorial distribution of refugees by ESPON regions

The inflow of refugees from Ukraine in case A (limited damage and a short war) will mainly concern the so-called First-Contact countries, i.e. those with a land border with Ukraine (Fig. 5.1). The inflow will definitely be concentrated in Poland (1.567 million) and its regions. Largest numbers of people will remain in the Warsaw-Capital region (348,100), and mainly in Warsaw itself. A large inflow will also be noted for two regions, i.e. Małopolskie (171,600) and Dolnośląskie (161,000), given that both are characterised by dynamic economic development and an already substantial number of migrants from Ukraine arriving prior to the outbreak of the war. Lublin Voivodeship, bordering with Ukraine, will also see a significant inflow (of maybe 143,300), with this being a level much higher than can be anticipated for Podkarpackie Voivodeship, notwithstanding the way in which this also borders with Ukraine, but is treated as more of a transit region. On the other hand, a small scale of inflow can in particular be observed in the two Polish regions of Podlaskie and Warmińsko-Mazurskie. The former borders with Belarus and the latter with the Kaliningrad District of Russia. This demonstrates a reluctance on the part of Ukrainian citizens to settle near territories belonging to the aggressor countries. In the case of Poland, the inflow of Ukrainian nationals is primarily a reflection of a network of existing migration ties, against a background of geographical, cultural and linguistic proximity. The large labour market is also not without significance. More than 428,900 Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war will arrive in Romania. Where that state's regional configuration is concerned, it is Bucharest that will be markedly dominant (at 118,300), while the distribution across other regions will be a relatively even one.

Figure 5.1: Inflows of refugees from Ukraine by region, Cases A-D





Case A envisages more than 279,000 Ukrainian citizens arriving in Hungary, mainly in Budapest (98,300) and the region neighbouring Ukraine (Észak-Alföld, 73,200). For Slovakia, the number is an estimated 196,100, the vast majority of whom will remain in the Východné Slovensko region neighbouring with Ukraine (141,200, or 72% of the total inflow). In the remaining ESPON Space countries the inflow of Ukrainians will be relatively small (at 303,300 in total). Of the countries concerned, it will be the Czech Republic that will receive the largest inflow (131,400), with this primarily concerning Prague and its surroundings (Střední Čechy; 70,400 people in total), as well as Lithuania (28,900).

In Case B (limited damage but a long war) there will be limited change in the spatial distribution of inflows, at either national or regional levels. The main streams will still go to the First-Contact countries, above all to Poland (1,603,000). However, this inflow will be slightly greater than in Case A. Regions with the highest values for flows will experience even greater streams (greater by 2-3% than in Case A). Western European countries will be much more affected by the inflow of people from Ukraine, though this will not yet be clearly visible regionally. Total numbers outside First-Contact countries will be markedly greater – at up to 866,400. This may be due to the first signs of saturation of accommodation facilities in the First-Contact countries and refugee reception capacities. Hence, streams of people will head to other countries to a greater extent. However, geographical proximity and migration networks will continue to play a decisive role.

In Case C (major destruction, but in the context of a short war), severe war damage will result in an even greater outflow of refugees from Ukraine, both from war-afflicted and non-war areas. The inflow of Ukrainian citizens to the First-Contact countries will be even larger, as will those into other countries, which will record approx. The inflow of Ukrainian citizens to First-Contact countries will be even larger, as will those to other countries, which will experience an increase of about 45% compared with Case B. In some Western European countries there will be noticeable concentrations of people coming from Ukraine (in Italy into Lombardy - 17,800, Campania - 14,000; in Spain: Cataluña - 15,600, Comunidad de Madrid - 15,500, Comunidad Valenciana - 14,400 and Andalucía - 11,500; in Portugal: Área Metropolitana de Lisboa - 14,300 and Norte - 12,100; and in Denmark: Midtjylland - 11,900). In addition, Lithuania, with its small population, will experience a relatively large influx of people from Ukraine (of some 120,400 people).

Case D (of major destruction in the context of a long war) assumes the largest number of people arriving from Ukraine. Apart from the First-Contact countries, which will receive more than 4.6 million people (Poland - 2.9 million, Romania - 804,100, Hungary - 523,000 and Slovakia - 367,600), the regions of other ESPON Space countries will also be affected greatly (receiving a total of 3.4 million people). The already mentioned Case C situation will be augmented by further regions of Western European countries: in Italy - Emilia-Romagna (29,100) and Lazio (20,500), in Portugal - Centro (20,800), in Sweden - Stockholm (26,900), in Germany - Berlin (28,000), Oberbayern (25,800) and Düsseldorf (24,600), and in France - Île de France (23,100). The inflow into the Baltic States will also increase significantly, especially in regions of Lithuania (Sostinės regionas - 138,800, Vidurio ir vakaru Lietuvos regionas - 186,200).


In relation to the population of the regions in case A, very high numbers of refugees from Ukraine are recorded in Central and Eastern Europe. In some regions of Poland (including Warsaw), as well as Slovakia and Hungary, and in Bucharest, the level is at about 10%. These values correspond with the current (May 2022) level of migration inflow. Taking into account the structure of migration (dominated by women and children) such a level can be treated as a challenge for the labour market, and even more so for the proper functioning of public services. In some regions of Poland, as early as in April, numbers of refugees from Ukraine aged 0-18 accounted for 15% of all members of the analogous age group in the Polish population. This reflects the unbalanced demographic pyramid in Poland. Child care and school education can thus be expected to be key dimensions capable of limiting further concentration of refugees in certain regions.

In cases B and C, high inflows in relation to population already spill over into practically the whole of Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Baltic states. Nevertheless, the greatest concentration of refugees takes place in metropolitan areas, especially in capitals. In other European countries, the relative level of inflow remains low, but differences are already visible, indicating a greater burden on Scandinavia (especially Denmark), Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany and Bulgaria. In Western Europe, the capital cities are not places of concentration of refugees to the extent observed in the CEECs.

A significantly different picture for differences in the indicator can only be observed in Case D. Practically the entire territories of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will record population growth of almost 10% as a result of refugee inflow. In Western Europe the figures are lower, but even so account for more than 1% of the previous population in some areas. This is to be observed in Portugal, Denmark and the Stockholm area of Sweden. Internal differentiation is to be seen in Germany and Spain (with a concentration on the east coast). In France, Paris has the highest concentration of refugees.

The development of the war in Ukraine may also influence the migration situation in Belarus. However, the scale of this inflow will be incomparably smaller than in the case of Ukraine. In all four cases, the spatial distribution of the inflow of migrants from Belarus will remain basically unchanged. Belarusians show much lower spatial mobility than Ukrainians, so the largest concentrations of Belarusians will be located in neighbouring countries (Poland and Lithuania) and the Czech Republic. In both Cases A and C, the inflow of migrants from Belarus will be very similar, due to the short-term nature of the war. In both cases there are several dominant regions, i.e. Lithuania's Vidurio ir vakaru Lietuvos regionas (7300) and Sostines regionas (5400), Poland's regions of Warsaw Capital City (4300) and Podlaskie (3400) and the Czech Republic's Praha (2400). The remaining ESPON Space countries will experience a total influx of less than 10,000 Belarusian citizens.


**Figure 5.2: Migration inflows from Belarus by region, Cases A-D**



In Case B, on the other hand, a prolonged war may lead to increased migration outflow. The main directions remain unchanged, but regions affected will face an inflow more than twice as large (in extreme cases up to around 20,000 - in Vidurio ir vakaru Lietuvos regionas). Outside Poland, Lithuania and the Czech Republic over 26,000 people will emigrate from Belarus, mainly to Germany (6500), Italy (3400), the UK (2300) and Spain (2200). However, by region, this inflow will be hardly visible.

In Case D (major destruction and a long war) – i.e. the one assuming the largest scale of outflow from Belarus, the main inflow regions will be accompanied by others also receiving relatively large numbers of migrants from Belarus. These will be: Cataluña (1000), Stockholm (1300), Berlin (800), Lombardy (800), and Île de France (800). In addition, there will be relatively large concentrations in Latvia (3800) and Estonia (1800).


**Figure 5.3: Inflow of refugees from Ukraine per 1000 inhabitants by region, cases A-D**



The war in Ukraine may have much greater migration consequences for Russia than for Belarus. Since the day of Russia's attack on Ukraine, an outflow of Russian citizens is to be observed, mainly by air and to some extent by land, and mainly to Finland. The spatial distribution of the migration inflow from Russia is different from in the case of Ukrainians and Belarusians. It is definitely concentrated in Western European countries.

In Case A, this inflow is mainly concentrated in Germany (28,700), the Czech Republic (18,400) and the United Kingdom (14,700). In contrast, several major regions of inflow from Russia stand out in the regional setting, i.e. Praha in the Czech Republic (11,500), Île de France (4800), Cataluña (4300) and Comunidad Valenciana (3700), as well as Helsinki-Uusimaa in Finland (4000). We are thus potentially dealing with migration to metropolitan areas or to European regions attractive to tourists. The regions of Central European countries participate in this inflow to only a limited small extent. It is also worth noting the migration inflow to the geographically-distant Cyprus, given that this is treated by many Russians as a tax haven.

The magnitude of migration inflows in Case C differs little from Case A. The spatial picture of migration inflows is thus little-changed. The additional migration inflow (compared with Case A) is "absorbed" by the aforementioned metropolises and tourist regions. However, it is worth noting the existing networks between the Baltic States and Russia, which bring together almost 13,000 migrants from the latter (under Case C).

**Figure 5.4: Migration inflows from Russia by region, Cases A-D**

In case of a prolonged war (Case B), migration streams from Russia may increase. This will be reflected in the migration inflows to ESPON Space looked at on a regional basis. The regions mentioned in Case A with the highest numbers of migrants from Russia will be joined *inter alia* by Berlin (6400), Oberbayern (4200) and Düsseldorf (4200), by Finland's Etelä-Suomi (5400), by Vienna (5000) and Stockholm (3900) and by the Lombardy region of Italy (3500).

It is in Case D (major destruction in the circumstances of a long war) that the largest migration outflow from Russia is predicted. However, even with such a large-scale of inflow, regions in CEECs other than the Czech Republic, like Poland's Capital City region around Warsaw - 6100, Budapest - 5000 and Prague (50,600) may be joined by Île de France (21,000), Cataluña (19,000), Helsinki-Uusimaa (17,700), Comunidad Valenciana (16,300) and Berlin (12,600) as places above all affected by inflow. However, there are also likely to be large inflows into Estonia (14,300), Latvia (12,500) and Cyprus (10,800).



## 6 Conclusions

The war in Ukraine is having an unprecedented impact on the EU economy and society, even as this is seen to be differentiated quite markedly from one area to another.

The recent-history origins of this conflict go back to the early 1990s, with the situation seen to have been intensifying steadily over the 30 years since that time. The main reason for the aggression now might be sought in a Russian motivation to maintain influence in Eastern Europe, and within the area the Soviet Union once occupied. Indeed, each and every step Ukraine has taken to distance itself from its Soviet legacy, and to integrate in the EU context, can be seen to have encountered considerable opposition, as well as political and economic provocation, on the part of Moscow.

Forecasts for the current war's duration and degree of escalation are seen to differ significantly, given varied assessments of the armed forces of Ukraine and Russia, the conceivability of nuclear or chemical weapons being used, and the behaviour of political elites as they address the West's energy dependence on Russia.

It is against the background of that ongoing situation that EU Member States received their first wave of Ukrainian refugees, sent by the onset of the war, with mass shelling of large cities and the occupation of certain territories. The thwarted occupation of some regions and attendant shift of hostilities to the east and south of the country have ensured an intensified return flow of migrants into Ukraine, while limiting new entries considerably, to a point where migration can already be viewed as having somewhat more of an economic basis. This situation is largely in line with this report's Case A (foreseeing a war of limited intensity and short duration, which also takes into account a small increase in numbers of Belarusian and Russian migrants as a reflection of the impacts of sanctions and domestic politics. The main recipients of migrants in these cases are the Countries of First Contact, i.e. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, albeit with prominent roles also played by Germany and the Czech Republic.

Among these Countries of First Contact, Poland needs to be singled out as already in receipt of more than 3 million refugees, of which a great many have been provided with both accommodation and social support. The case of Poland and several other countries shows intra-regional disparities to refugee locations, with a significant attraction to large cities and centres in which Ukrainian diaspora are already located. These facts were also taken account of as cases were being simulated. The main feature characterising the flows of Ukrainian migrants is a high level of feminisation, and the presence of a large number of children – and these are circumstances that may ensure a further impact on the EU's labour market and social infrastructure. Intentions to stay on in the EU are determined both by the current situation in Ukraine and by opportunities for adaptation and employment in the EU.

However, given the *de facto* uncertainty as regards prospects, this Report has also analysed three other cases (B – of a protracted war of limited severity, C – of a short if severe war, and D – of a long and intensive one). Each of these envisages a more major increase in the flow of refugees, as well as an increase in the share of these reaching other EU countries, as well as areas beyond ESPON space. The consequences of cases C and D, which will lead to one or more new waves of migration involving millions of refugees from Ukraine (as well as a markedly larger numbers of Russian and Belarusian migrants), may prove particularly difficult. The response to such challenges will need to involve extremely effective measures at the levels of both the EU and individual countries, even as those First-Contact states will continue to be particularly vulnerable.

Each of the analysed flows (involving citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) is seen to be characterised by a different distribution. Belarus is responsible for migration of the most-limited mobility and geographical range of impact. Its generated migration inflows concentrate mainly in the two neighbouring countries (Poland and Lithuania) and indeed in their border regions, as well as in the Czech Republic. Western European countries only participate to a limited extent in the migration inflow of Belarusian citizens.

The migration inflow from Russia in turn features a wide range of influences. Thus far it concentrates mainly in Western Europe and the Czech Republic. It is mainly metropolitan areas that are involved (like Prague, Paris, Barcelona, London, Berlin, Vienna and Helsinki) as well as tourist regions (of Spain). The legacy of the USSR (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) or economic ties (Cyprus as tax haven) remain strong. In turn, CEECs (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) do not in general participate in the migration flow.

For obvious reasons, the inflow of Ukrainian citizens should be treated differently from those involving Belarusians and Russians. Where Ukrainians are involved, the inflow concentrates mainly in the neighbour countries (of First Contact). In each case, it is Poland, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia that experience the largest influxes of people from Ukraine. Within the regional system, the main attracting factors are existing migration networks (not only in Poland, but also even in Spain and Italy), as well as geographical proximity and the presence of metropolitan areas with attractive labour markets.

## Annex: National policies towards refugees from Ukraine

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
First-Contact countries	Poland	<i>Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2022 r. o pomocy obywatelom Ukrainy w związku z konfliktem zbrojnym na terytorium tego państwa</i> [1]	Any identity document is welcome (e.g. biometric passport, identity card, military book); in the case of children, if they have no other documents, a birth certificate will help in establishing identity. However, "no person [fleeing the war] will be sent back to Ukraine".	18 months	Access of Ukrainian citizens to the Polish labour market and registration in the district labour office is guaranteed. In order to take advantage of this solution, an employer must, within 7 days, notify via <a href="http://praca.gov.pl">praca.gov.pl</a> the competent labour office about entrusting work to a foreigner. Ukrainian citizens can also use the services of the labour market in the form of, <i>inter alia</i> , job placement, vocational counselling and training - on the same basis as Polish citizens[2]	Citizens of Ukraine may apply for a one-off cash subsistence benefit of 300 PLN per person[2]	Children of Ukrainian citizens are accepted to Polish schools free of charge. The limit of children that can attend one class/ kindergarten group has been increased. Additional free Polish language classes are organized[3]	Ukrainian refugees receive access to free healthcare on the same basis as Polish citizens.	<a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/ua">https://www.gov.pl/web/ua</a> <a href="https://pomag.amukrainie.gov.pl/">https://pomag.amukrainie.gov.pl/</a>	Within 60 days of arrival, Ukrainians can apply for a PESEL number. An identity document is needed, but if a person does not have one, he/she can be given a PESEL on the basis of an application. Having this number is useful to manage certain formalities such as opening a bank account, registering for a doctor's appointment or submitting the annual tax declaration, etc.
First-Contact countries	Slovakia	On 16 March 2022 Slovakia adopted <i>Lex Ukrajina</i> , a complex package of laws including the Act on asylum and the Act on residence of foreigners, aimed at facilitating the integration of those fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The legislative package covers residence and temporary protection, access to the labour market, education, transportation, accommodation, social protection and healthcare[5].	Entry into Slovakia is allowed for anyone fleeing the war in Ukraine. Currently, entry is also possible for people who do not have a valid travel document (biometric passport). In this case, it is necessary to apply for temporary shelter or asylum. Persons travelling with children are advised to carry at least the child's birth certificate. Persons without a valid passport are advised to carry other documents (e.g. identity card, driving licence, residence permit in Ukraine, birth certificates of children, etc.)[6]	90 days with a biometric passport, after obtaining the status of temporary protection until 4 March 2023, extendable to 3 years[7]	Residents of Ukraine who have been granted temporary shelter have the same access to the labour market as citizens of Slovakia (except civil servants). They can be employed on the basis of an employment contract or by agreement[6]	Refugees can also access social protection: they may apply for material needs benefits to the amount of €68.80, a protective allowance to the amount of €70.40 per month, and a child allowance to the amount of €19.30[6]	Children of Ukrainian citizens who have arrived to Slovakia as a result of the conflict and have applied for temporary shelter or asylum are entitled to free education in Slovakia[8]	Refugees receive urgent medical care upon presentation of proof of temporary refugee status, and the cost of this is covered by the budget of the Ministry of Healthcare. Refugees are able to receive urgent medical care within the first 30 days after entering Slovakia. Asylum seekers, as well as those who have applied for temporary protection, will have indefinite access to urgent medical care.	<a href="https://ua.gov.sk/?csr=3426529708503970951">https://ua.gov.sk/?csr=3426529708503970951</a>	<a href="https://www.ukraine.gov.sk/">https://www.ukraine.gov.sk/</a> - re-sources for Ukrainian refugees in Slovakia

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
First-Contact countries	Hungary	On 4 March 2022, the Member States of the European Union decided to activate Council Directive 2001/55/EC on displaced persons, to provide an immediate response to the mass displacement of people because of the military invasion of Ukraine by Russia which began on 24 February 2022. The directive enables immediate and temporary refuge in the European Union and facilitates the sharing of responsibility for people fleeing Ukraine between Member States. Every Ukrainian crossing the border with the EU automatically receives temporary protection status. With it, refugees can go to any EU country and live there[9]	Entry into Hungary is allowed for anyone fleeing the war in Ukraine. Currently, entry is also possible for people who do not have a valid travel document (biometric passport). Only Ukrainian citizens and their immediate families can receive temporary protection in Hungary. Citizens of other countries coming from Ukraine cannot receive temporary protection[10]	90 days with a biometric passport, after obtaining the status of temporary protection until 4 March 2023, extendable to 3 years.	The employment of non-Hungarians in Hungary is subject to a work permit issued by the Hungarian authorities; however, numerous simplifications have been made in order to help Ukrainians stay and work in Hungary. The most important measure of these is the exemption of Ukrainian nationals from numerous restrictions and administrative authorisation procedures favouring Hungarians when applying for jobs[11][12]	Once the temporary protection status is granted, the beneficiary remains eligible for shelter and food provision by the authorities for the entire duration of the protection status. Applicants and beneficiaries of temporary protection are eligible for state financial support in the amount of a monthly 22,800 HUF (around 60 EUR). Families with children get a monthly financial aid per child. After one child, this amount is 13,700 HUF (around 35 EUR)[12]	Access to education for children and teenagers is ensured under temporary protection.	People with temporary protection have the right to use public health services and are entitled to have necessary and emergency medical treatment. The same applies to those who applied, but not yet received temporary protection. These people can get necessary and emergency services treatment. In addition, they are entitled to get oncological treatment as well as other specialized treatment in case of chronic diseases.	No data	Hungarian authorities state that they could welcome over 900,000 Ukrainian refugees who are fleeing the war.



Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
First-Contact countries	Romania	At the level of the Government: establishment of a high-level decision-making Task-Force, an operational Task-force, called "Ukraine Commission" and the Humanitarian Assistance Strategic Coordination Group. Romania's response to refugees' crisis is structured on two layers of intervention: First EMERGENCY response and Second PROTECTION Response. Moreover, Based on the Council Decision, Romanian Government issued the G.D. No.367/18.03.2022 regarding the Temporary Protection of persons displaced from Ukraine[13]	Everybody can enter Romania, even without biometric passport, however further procedures will differ depending on what documents an individual Ukrainian entering the country owns. All children coming from Ukraine are accepted into Romania. It is advisable to carry an identity document of the minor or a birth certificate[14][15]	90 days with a biometric passport, after obtaining whose stay in Romania is the status of temporary protection until 4 March 2023; it can be automatically extended for periods of 6 months, for a maximum of 1 year.	Residents of Ukraine legal have the same access to the labour market as Romanian citizens. If they want to work in a field in which they have experience/for which they have studied, but they do not have the necessary documents (diplomas, certifications, etc.), they can provide a statement that they have had training/experience in the field. This declaration is valid for 12 months, but can be extended. Ukrainian citizens can benefit from measures to stimulate employment, as well as protection within the unemployment insurance system, under the conditions provided by law for Romanian citizens.	If a person fled Ukraine on or after February 24, 2022 and stayed in Romania for at least 7 days, he/she can request cash financial assistance from UNHCR.	Children's access to education is guaranteed, free of charge, regardless of their status in Romania. In order to integrate into the education system, minors seeking asylum or benefiting from a form of international protection can take an intensive Romanian language course. During the introductory course in Romanian, minors seeking asylum or beneficiaries of a form of international protection in Romania participate in activities of a theoretical, practical and recreational nature, without their presence being registered in official documents.	Free medical assistance and care services similar to those available to Romanian citizens, for a period of 90 days (with the biometric passport). Primary care and treatment, emergency hospital care, as well as medical care and treatment, all free, in cases of acute or chronic life-threatening diseases, for citizens seeking asylum in Romania[16]	<a href="https://www.gov.ro/ro/pagina/ykpa-ha-pa3om-aomora-mo-bnbwe">https://www.gov.ro/ro/pagina/ykpa-ha-pa3om-aomora-mo-bnbwe</a>	For more info see: <a href="https://dopomoha.ro/uk/prima-pagina">https://dopomoha.ro/uk/prima-pagina</a>

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
First-Contact countries	Moldova	No data	For adults - a national ID card or passport; for minors - a birth certificate/child's birth certificate issued by a health institution, a national ID card (identity card/identity card), passport. When crossing the border, children who do not have any documents with them but are accompanied by their parents may cross the border after the border formalities have been completed by the Border Guard Inspector General.	Without refugee status, foreigners may stay in the country legally for a maximum of 90 days within a 180-day period. Ukrainian refugees should apply for asylum. Examination of an application can take over 6 months[18]	Ukrainian citizens have the right to work on the territory of the Republic of Moldova without obtaining the right of temporary residence in order to perform work, only on the basis of an individual contract of employment for a specified period of time[18]	Refugees and beneficiaries of humanitarian protection may apply for a state allowance of approximately EUR 30 for a maximum period of six months. However, Moldova's difficult economic situation does not always guarantee the full exercise of those rights, such as financial support to vulnerable groups, housing, employment, and language courses. However, each eligible refugee is entitled to help from UNHCR in amount of 2,200 MDL/month. The grant will be renewed for refugees remaining in the country[19][20]	Every child has the right to go to school on the same rights as Moldovans. No additional documents or payment is needed for public schools. The process of registration may vary depending on the type of school[18]	Moldovan government indicates that the country is close to reaching its maximum capacity due to overload of healthcare system. List of offers from volunteers: <a href="https://dopomoga.gov.md/">https://dopomoga.gov.md/</a>	<a href="https://dopomoga.gov.md/">https://dopomoga.gov.md/</a> (only in Russian)	In the first days of March 2022, the Moldovan and Romanian authorities created a so-called "green corridor" between the two countries. The aim was to improve the flow of Ukrainian refugees, with free buses transporting refugees from one country to the other.
Other ESPON	Czechia	<i>Lex Ukrajina</i> : The Czech government has approved a package of three laws that focus on the fastest and smoothest possible registration of refugees, their integration into the work process, the provision of insurance and the admission of children to schools. The validity of these three Laws is from 21 March 2022 until 31 March 2023[21]	Visa-free; Ukrainian biometric passport is needed to enter, but if a person does not have it, it is advised to bring other documents proving her/his identity. It is also necessary to arrange health insurance for at least the first few weeks for necessary and urgent care. Registration with the Foreign Police of the Czech Republic is mandatory within 3 days after arrival[22]	90 days with a biometric passport, after obtaining the status of temporary protection until 4 March 2023, extendable to 3 years.	Ukrainian citizens who have obtained a special visa after February 24 can work in the Czech Republic without a work permit and are entitled to unemployment benefits.	Humanitarian aid of 5,000 CZK is available for holders of special visas. The financial support should be used primarily to cover basic living needs and it is distributed by the regional branches of the Labor Office.	Capacities of schools were increased so they can accept Ukrainian children; Ukrainian students are allowed to replace the documents required for admission with an affidavit; secondary schools, conservatories and higher vocational schools extend the deadline for applications the time for entrance exams for students from Ukraine, and provide a possibility of taking the mathematics exam in Ukrainian or English.	The foreigner is covered by the public health insurance, even for the period of 30 days prior to the date of granting the visa. For example, if a foreigner arrives in a serious health condition, is treated in a hospital and afterwards obtains the visa, he/she is fully covered by the public health insurance system.	<a href="https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/ua.aspx">https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/ua.aspx</a>	

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
Other ESPON	Germany	In order to be registered and receive state support, a refugee must contact a reception centre in her/his place of residence or the police. When registered, if a person is claiming social benefits, he/she will also be told where in Germany he/she should initially live. For now, war refugees from Ukraine do not need a residence title. However, the regulation is initially limited until 31st August 2022. Within the period until - according to the current status - 31st August 2022, an application must be made to the competent foreigners' authority for the granting of a residence title according to Section 24 of the German Residence Act[23]	Biometric passport is very helpful with formalities. However, it is not required from Ukrainians to have a biometric passport to enter Germany[23]	People fleeing from Ukraine are exempt from the requirement of a residence title until 31st August 2022. Ukrainians in Germany can obtain a quick residence permit valid for up to three years, thanks to the previously unused paragraph 24 of the German residence act[23]	Once a person has received a residence permit for temporary protection, he/she is allowed to work as soon as the foreigners' authority allows him/her to work by entering "gainful employment permitted" in the residence title. There are also other residence titles that allow to work, e.g. for skilled workers or for family reunification[23]	All persons covered by the scope of application of Section 24 of the German Residence Act receive benefits to cover their living expenses and medical care according to the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act (AsylbLG). In order to receive benefits, registration is usually required, e.g. at reception centres or foreigner's authorities.	Temporary residence permit gives an access to education for minors.	The Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, AsylbLG) also covers health care benefits. During the first 18 months of your stay, benefits cover the necessary medical and dental treatment in case of acute illness or pain, treatment with drugs and wound dressings, and other benefits needed for the recovery from or relief of illness or effects of illness[24]	<a href="https://www.germany4ukraine.de/hilfeportal-ua">https://www.germany4ukraine.de/hilfeportal-ua</a>	The following courses and services were launched for protection seekers from Ukraine who have a residence permit under Section 24 of the Residence Act: Federal Migration Counselling for Adults (MBE), Initial orientation courses for asylum seekers (EOK), Programme "Migrant women simply strong in everyday life" (MiA-Kurse), Integration courses, Vocational language courses[23]

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
Other ESPON	France	On 4 March 2022, the Member States of the European Union decided to activate Council Directive 2001/55/EC on displaced persons, to provide an immediate response to the mass displacement of people because of the military invasion of Ukraine by Russia which began on 24 February 2022. The directive enables immediate and temporary refuge in the European Union and facilitates the sharing of responsibility for people fleeing Ukraine between Member States[9]	Ukrainian citizens holding a biometric passport do not need a short-stay visa to travel to the Schengen area and thus to France. Those who wish to travel to France and do not have a biometric passport (or do not have a travel document) are invited to go to one of the consular offices in the countries bordering Ukraine so that their situation can be examined (to obtain a visa or a travel pass)[25]	90 days. Ukrainian citizens wishing to stay beyond 90 days are invited to quickly contact the prefecture of their place of residence via their website to request an extension of their right to stay under the temporary protection. It works the same way as in other EU countries. In the case of Ukrainian citizens already present on French territory and holding a residence permit, their residence permit will be automatically extended by 3 months as the expiration date approaches. The issuance of a temporary residence permit on French territory for a period of 6 months, bearing the mention "beneficiary of temporary protection"	Beneficiaries of temporary protection are authorized to work as soon as they obtain their temporary residence permit, subject to the rules of the chosen profession. Common law is applied to them, particularly with regard to remuneration.	No data	Temporary residence permit gives an access to education for minors.	Temporary residence permit gives an access to French healthcare system.	<a href="https://parraimage.refugies.info/ukraine/">https://parraimage.refugies.info/ukraine/</a>	

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
Other ESPON	Spain	The Spanish government was one of the first to adopt special European Union measures in response to the wave of refugees. On 4 March 2022, the Member States of the European Union decided to activate Council Directive 2001/55/EC on displaced persons, to provide an immediate response to the mass displacement of people because of the military invasion of Ukraine by Russia which began on 24 February 2022. The directive enables immediate and temporary refuge in the European Union and facilitates the sharing of responsibility for people fleeing Ukraine between Member States[9]	Ukrainian nationals do not need to apply for a visa to enter Spain, and they are entitled to move freely within the EU for a period of 90 days. Those who wish to travel to Spain and do not have a biometric passport (or do not have a travel document) are invited to go to one of the consular offices in the countries bordering Ukraine so that their situation can be examined. People who want temporary protection must be able to show they meet all the admission criteria by presenting the relevant documentation to the competent authorities.	90 days with a biometric passport, after obtaining the status of temporary protection until 4 March 2023, extendable to 3 years.	Among the temporary measures, refugees fleeing the war in Ukraine are given temporary residency and work permits within 24 hours.	No data	Refugees also have access to free schooling under temporary protection.	Refugees have access to public health care and discounted medicine under temporary protection.	No data	
Other ESPON	Italy	On 4 March 2022, the Member States of the European Union decided to activate Council Directive 2001/55/EC on displaced persons, to provide an immediate response to the mass displacement of people because of the military invasion of Ukraine by Russia which began on 24 February 2022. The directive enables immediate and temporary refuge in the European Union and facilitates the sharing of responsibility for people fleeing Ukraine between Member States[9]	Ukrainian nationals do not need to apply for a visa to enter Italy, and they are entitled to move freely within the EU for a period of 90 days. Those who wish to travel to Italy and do not have a biometric passport (or do not have a travel document) are invited to go to one of the consular offices in the countries bordering Ukraine so that their situation can be examined. People who want temporary protection must be able to show they meet all the admission criteria by presenting the relevant documentation to the competent authorities.	90 days with a biometric passport from the time of entry into the Schengen area, after obtaining the status of temporary protection until 4 March 2023, extendable to 3 years. 90 days with a biometric passport. If a person decides to stay in Italy more than 90 days, he/she must go to the local Police Headquarters (Questura) - Immigration Office to receive all the necessary information on the possibilities to regularize the stay on the Italian territory.	Under temporary protection refugees are entitled to access to the labour market.	No data	Refugees also have access to free schooling under temporary protection.	Refugees have access to public health care and discounted medicine under temporary protection.	No data	175000 Ukrainian refugees are expected in Italy[26]

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
Third countries	UK	Family members of Ukrainians already living in the UK and those who have no relative in the UK can come to the UK. For the latter group of refugees, London offers sponsored humanitarian visas under the Ukraine Family Scheme program. Under this arrangement, a UK citizen or local authority will be able to invite Ukrainians at their own expense.	For the first few weeks after the outbreak of war the British only allowed in those who already had relatives in the UK and were able to document this. An additional problem was the requirement for a visa. Even if it was a formality, refugees had to appear in person at diplomatic missions. Nowadays, Ukrainians who end up in the UK fleeing war will not have to meet other traditional requirements for foreigners. There will be no requirement to speak the language or provide proof of earnings from a potential employer. However, there will still be security checks. The visa application is free and there is no need to pay a health fee or biometric registration fee[27]	Up to 3 years[28]	Having obtained a visa, refugees are given the right to work in the UK.	Refugees under the Homes for Ukrainians program will be entitled to social benefits.	Ukrainians with a humanitarian visa will be able to use all public services including schooling for children.	Ukrainians with a humanitarian visa will be able to use all public services including healthcare.	<a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-a-ukraine-family-scheme-visa">https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-a-ukraine-family-scheme-visa</a>	As of 5 May: 36,300 family visas issued, from 44,200 applications; 59,100 sponsorship scheme visas issued, from 80,900 applications

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
Third countries	USA	Uniting for Ukraine Programme: the United States announced its intention to admit up to 100,000 Ukrainians through various legal procedures - both as refugees and through other programmes, with an emphasis on admitting Ukrainians who have family in the United States. The White House has declared that these measures will be coordinated with the European Union. They are intended to complement the steps taken by Ukraine's neighbours. Persons benefiting from the programme must meet the following definition of a refugee: a person outside the country of his nationality or outside his country of residence who is unwilling or unable to return to that country due to persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, the person should prove that he or she has failed to settle in the country of his or her current residence and that he or she belongs to one of the groups perceived as a refugee priority by the US government. Refugee claims are processed at the respective foreign immigration offices attached to the US embassies[29]	Biometric passport, or, in the case of children, they must be enrolled in the parent's passport. To qualify for the Uniting for Ukraine program, a person must also have a support person who has filed a Form I-134 on behalf of the newcomer, which has been reviewed by USCIS and confirmed as sufficient; the person filing this form must be verified by the U.S. government for protection from exploitation and abuse, as well as ensure that they are financially able to support the Ukrainians they agree to support. One must also pass biographical and biometric security tests[30]	Ukrainians who have been in the US since at least 1 March will be granted temporary protection status and may remain in the country for another 18 months. They may not be included in the Uniting for Ukraine programme[31]	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data	Reportedly, 15,000 Ukrainians have arrived in the US since 24 February, mainly via Mexico (as of 21.04.2022) (Reuters). There are about 1 million people of Ukrainian origin living in the US.

Group	Country	Policy/strategy towards refugees from Ukraine	Required documents	Legal stay - how long	Employment	Social benefits	Education of children	Healthcare	Government's site in Ukrainian	Other/remarks
Third countries	Canada	Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) launched on 17th March 2022: with the CUAET, Ukrainians and their immediate family members of any nationality may stay in Canada as temporary residents. The federal government says most applications for the program will be processed within 14 days.	Applicants who are overseas need to apply online for a Canadian visitor visa and provide their biometrics (fingerprints and a photo). Applicants who do not have a valid passport may still apply, and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) will issue a single journey travel document on a case-by-case basis, where appropriate. Visa applications can be submitted online from anywhere in the world. Biometrics can be given at any visa application centre (VAC) outside of Ukraine. VACs are open in Moldova, Romania, Austria and Poland, and there is an extensive VAC network across Europe. Refugees don't pay the biometrics fee. All visa applicants will undergo standard background checks and be carefully screened before coming into Canada[32]	Up to 3 years	Applicants for CUAET are encouraged to apply for a 3-year open work permit at the same time as their visa application. This permit will allow them to work in Canada. The Government of Canada is also calling on employers who wish to support Ukrainians with offers of employment to register these offers on Job Bank's Jobs for Ukraine webpage. Job Bank will then work with local organizations and employers to help connect them with Ukrainians seeking work in their communities.	No data	Elementary and high school students can register for and start attending school as soon as they arrive in Canada, and anyone looking to study at the post-secondary level can apply for a study permit once on Canadian soil.	No data	There's no official Ukrainian version of the government site, however information about CUAET is available in Ukrainian: <a href="https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-launches-new-temporary-residence-pathway-to-welcome-those-fleeing-the-war-in-ukraine-en-ua.html">https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-launches-new-temporary-residence-pathway-to-welcome-those-fleeing-the-war-in-ukraine-en-ua.html</a>	CUAET applications received: 204227; CUAET applications accepted: 91482 (17.03.2022-04.05.2022)



**Appendix - references**

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The ESPON EGTC is the Single Beneficiary of the ESPON 2020 Cooperation Programme, whose single Operation is implemented by the ESPON EGTC, and co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the EU Member States and the Partner States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

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